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Recent Developments
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - STATEMENTS MADE DURING A
PREARRAIGNMENT DELAY THAT EXCEEDS Six HOURS RULED
INADMISSIBLE IN PENNSYLVANIA.
Commonwealth v. Davenport (Pa. 1977)
Samuel R. Davenport was arrested on suspicion of murder and held by
the police for approximately nineteen and one-half hours before arraignment
in court.' During this time, Davenport was interrogated, placed in a lineup,
had his clothing taken for laboratory testing and, after eight hours of
detention, he confessed to the commission of the crime.2 Appealing from a
second degree murder conviction in the Philadelphia Court of Common
Pleas, Davenport asserted that his statement should have been suppressed
as "the product of unnecessary delay between arrest and arraignment in
violation of [rule 130 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure]."'3
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court4 reversed the conviction and granted a
new trial, holding that 1) with respect to Davenport, the unnecessary eight
hour delay between his arrest and confession required suppression of his
statement;5 and 2) with respect to future cases, unless the defendant is
1. Commonwealth v. Davenport, 471 Pa. 278, 282, 370 A.2d 301, 304 (1977). The
191/2 hour detention period was established by defendant's unrefuted testimony. Id. at
282, 370 A.2d at 304.
Arraignment as utilized in this case and in this note refers to the procedures
required for preliminary arraignment according to rule 140 of the Pennsylvania Rules
of Criminal Procedure. 471 Pa. at 283, 370 A.2d at 304. This preliminary arraignment
constitutes the defendant's first post-arrest appearance before a neutral judicial
official. Other jurisdictions have given different names to this procedure. See, e.g.,
MD. R. CRIM. P. 5(a) ("appearance before the magistrate"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-401
(1975) ("preliminary proceedings").
2. 471 Pa. at 281-82, 370 A.2d at 303-04. Eight hours after his arrest, defendant
made his first admission of guilt, followed by both a handwritten and a formal
typewritten statement. Id. at 282, 370 A.2d at 303-04.
3. Id. at 281, 370 A.2d at 303, citing PA. R. CRIM. P. 130 and Commonwealth v.
Futch, 447 Pa. 389, 290 A.2d 417 (1972). Rule 130 provides: "When a defendant has
been arrested without a warrant in a court case, he shall be taken without
unnecessary delay before the proper issuing authority where a complaint shall be filed
against him and he shall be given an immediate preliminary arraignment." PA. R.
CRIM. P. (emphasis added). Rule 122 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure
prohibits unnecessary prearraignment delay following arrests made with a warrant.
PA. R. CRIM. P. 122. Since a violation of rule 130 was asserted by Davenport, it is
assumed that the defendant was arrested without a warrant. See 471 Pa. at 280-81,
370 A.2d at 303. The time of preliminary arraignment is important because, according
to one source, police may have no control over the suspect after preliminary
arraignment. Interview with Gilbert Branche, Chief County Detective, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania (Jan. 13, 1978).
4. Jurisdiction in this case was based upon the Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act
of 1970, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 722(1) (Purdon Supp. 1977).
5. 471 Pa. at 281, 286, 370 A.2d at 303, 306. The period which the court measured
here was not that period between arrest and arraignment but rather the period
(366)
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arraigned within six hours of arrest, statements made after arrest but prior
to arraignment shall be inadmissible at trial. Commonwealth v. Davenport,
471 Pa. 278, 370 A.2d 301 (1977).
The origin of the Davenport court's approach to prearraignment delay is
traceable to two United States Supreme Court cases that were appeals from
federal prosecutions, McNabb v. United States6 and Mallory v. United
States.7 In McNabb, the Court ruled that statements by the defendants made
during a detention of indeterminate length should be suppressed' not for
constitutional reasons, but rather pursuant to the Court's power to supervise
the federal administration of criminal justice. 9 One of the policy reasons
behind this holding was to check reprehensible police behavior which might
be attributable to long detention. 10 In Mallory, the Supreme Court reversed
and remanded a conviction based upon a confession made during an
unreasonable overnight delay prior to arraignment."
between arrest and confession. Id. at 285, 370 A.2d at 305. The court stated: "We
conclude that the eight hour delay between appellant's arrest and his first admission
was unnecessary." Id. (footnote omitted). Perhaps the court used this period because
there was no evidence other than defendant's testimony which could establish when
the arraignment occurred. Id. at 282, 370 A.2d at 304. For other cases measuring
unnecessary delay between arrest and the eliciting of a statement, see note 37 infra.
6. 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
7. 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
8. See 318 U.S. at 334-35. Since there is no proof of the time of arraignment in
the record, it is never precisely stated in McNabb how long defendants were detained
before arraignment. However, in a subsequent congressional hearing on the
admissibility of evidence in federal cases it was acknowledged that the defendants
"were in fact arraigned in timely fashion." Admission of Evidence in Certain Cases:
Hearings on H.R. 3690 Before Subcomm. No. 2 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
78th Cong., 1st Sess. 27, 29 (1943) (testimony of Attorney General Biddle) (Sup. Doc.
No. Y 4.J89/1: Ev/3). Cases applying McNabb have developed the requirement that
statements elicited must have some reasonable relationship to the delay in order for
such statements to be suppressed. See United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65 (1944).
9. 318 U.S. at 340-42. The supervisory powers of the federal courts, first
extensively utilized by Justice Frankfurter in McNabb, have no clearly discernible
source at either common law, in Article III of the United States Constitution or in the
Enabling Act of 1934, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970). See Note, The Judge-Made Supervisory
Power of the Federal Courts, 53 GEO. L. J. 1050, 1051-56 (1965). Justice Frankfurter in
McNabb described the policy reasons behind the Court's supervisory powers:
Judicial supervision of the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts
implies the duty of establishing and maintaining civilized standards of
procedure and evidence. Such standards are not satisfied merely by observance
of those minimal historic safeguards for securing trial by reason which are
summarized as "due process of law" and below which we reach what is really
trial by force.
318 U.S. at 340.
10. 318 U.S. at 343-44. For the policy reasons behind the six-hour Davenport rule,
see notes 22-28 and accompanying text infra; text accompanying notes 41-43 infra.
11. 354 U.S. at 449, 453, 455-56. Justice Frankfurter's opinion for the majority
relied upon the holding in McNabb and upon rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Id. at 451-53 citing McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943)
and FED. RULES CRIM. P. 5(a). Rule 5(a) provides in pertinent part:
An officer making an arrest under a warrant issued upon a complaint or any
person making an arrest without a warrant shall take the arrested person
1977-1978]
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There is widespread acceptance of the need for prompt arraignment.
12
The "federal approach" as developed in McNabb - Mallory was first
without unnecessary delay before the nearest available federal magistrate....
If a person arrested without a warrant is brought before a magistrate or other
officer, a complaint shall be filed forthwith....
FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a). Justice Frankfurter's opinion stressed that, in light of the
legislative standard of arraignment "without unnecessary delay" an extended delay
was impermissible. 354 U.S. at 455, quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 5(a).
12. Many jurisdictions require prompt arraignment. The following rules and
statutes provide that an accused must be brought before a judicial officer "without
unnecessary delay," "without undue delay," "with reasonable promptness," or
synonymous language: CAL. PENAL CODE § 849(a) (West 1972); COLO. R. CRIM. P.
5(a)(1); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 6-49 (West Supp. 1977); IDAHO CODE § 19-615 (1948);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 109-1(a) (Smith-Hurd 1970); IOWA CODE ANN. § 758.1 (West
Supp. 1977-78); KAN. CRIM. CODE & CODE OF CRIM. PROC. § 22-2901(1)-(2) (Vernon
1970); ME. R. CRIM. P. 5(a); Miss. CODE ANN.§99-3-17 (1972); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 95-901(a)-(b) (1969); NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.178(i) (1971); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
140.20(1) (McKinney 1971); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-501 (Supp. 1975); 1 N.D. CENT.
CODE § 29-06-25 (1960); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.05 (Page 1975); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, § 181 (West 1969); PA. R. CRIM. P. 130; TEX. CRIM. PRO. CODE ANN. art, 15.17
(Vernon 1977); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-17 (Supp. 1977); VT. R. CRIM. P. 3(b); W. VA.
CODE § 62-1-5 (1977); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 970.01 (West 1971); Wyo. R. CRIM. P. 5(a).
The following statutes provide that an accused must be brought before a
judicial officer "forthwith," "immediately,": ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-601 (1964); IND.
CODE §35-4-1-1 (1976).. On the federal level, see §3501(c) of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c) (1976). For a discussion of
this act, see note 15 supra.
Several state rules and statutes provide that an accused be brought before a
judicial officer within a fixed time period. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.25.150(a) (Supp.
1977) (24 hours); ARiz. R. CRIM. P. 4.1(a) (24 hours); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1909
(Michie 1974) (24 hours); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3130 (24 hours); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-212
(1972) (48 hours); HAW. REV. STAT. § 803-9(5) (Supp. 1975) (48 hours); Ky. R. CRIM.
PROC. 3.02(2) (12 hours absent exigent circumstances in warrantless arrest cases); LA.
CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 229 (West 1967) (provides for notification of district
attorney within 48 hours); Id. art. 230.1(A) (Supp. 1977) (provides for bringing before
magistrate for appointment of counsel within 144 hours); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 4.02 (36
hours which may be extended in the case of felonies); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 544.170
(Vernon 1953) (20 hours); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-410 (1964) (one night or longer); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 594:20-a (1974) (24 hours). See also D.C. CODE § 4-140(a) (1973)
(prearraignment questioning may last only three hours).
Both the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice (Commission)
and the American Law Institute (ALI) have issued recommendations with respect to
unnecessary prearraignment delay. See NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOAL.S, Corrections Standard § 4.5 (1973) (Sup.
Doc. No. Y3.C86:2C81) [hereinafter cited as NATIONAL ADVISORY STANDARDS]; MODEL
CODE OF PREARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 130.2 (1975) [hereinafter cited as MODEL
CODE]. The Commission's standard provides in pertinent part as follows: "A person in
the physical custody of law enforcement agency on the basis of an arrest, with or
without a warrant, should be taken before a judicial officer without unnecessary
delay. In no case should the delay exceed 6 hours." NATIONAL ADVISORY STANDARDS,
Corrections § 4.5. The ALI's MODEL CODE provides in pertinent part:
(1) Disposition: Release, Production before Judicial Officer. Unless an order
is entered under Subsection (2) of this Section, not later than [two] hours after an
arrested person is brought to the police station the station officer shall make one
of the following dispositions: [release, release on recognizance, release with bail,
release subject to citation, retain custody].
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adopted in Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v. Futch.'3 The defendant in
Futch had been placed in a lineup without assistance of counsel "some
thirteen hours after his arrest."1 4 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, citing
McNabb-Mallory and the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, said
that "identifications based on a lineup held in violation of the unnecessary
delay [standards became] inadmissible at trial."'1 Futch was clarified
(2) Order for Screening in Certain Cases. The station officer may, in lieu of
making one of the dispositions authorized by Subsection (1) of this Section, order
that the arrested person be detained for a period of screening ....
(3) Duration of the Period of Screening. The period of screening authorized
by Subsection (2) of this Section shall not exceed the time actually necessary...
and in any event shall not exceed [three] hours.
MODEL CODE § 130.2 See also ABA STANDARDS, Pretrial Release § 4.1 (1968), which
provides in part that "every arrested person should be taken before a judicial officer
without unnecessary delay." Id.
13. 447 Pa. 389, 394, 290 A.2d 417, 419 (1972).
14. Id. at 392, 290 A.2d at 419.
15. Id. at 392-95, 290 A.2d at 418-20, citing Pa. R. Crim. P. 118, PA. STAT. ANN.
(Purdon Pamphlet 1972) (current version at PA. R. CRIM. P. 130). For the thrust of
these rules, see note 3 supra. In adopting this "federal approach," the court stated that
all evidence obtained during the delay shall be excluded except that which "has no
reasonable relationship to the delay whatsoever." 447 Pa. at 394, 290 A.2d at 419. In
so concluding, the court noted that the McNabb.Mallory rule "is subject to the
common sense caveat that the 'unnecessary delay' must have contributed to the
securing of the evidence." 447 Pa. at 393, 290 A.2d at 419. The court in Futch also
compared rule 118 to rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 447 Pa. at
394, 290 A.2d at 419. See note 11 supra. Since the Supreme Court has supervisory
power over federal courts, the McNabb rule of exclusion has not been imposed upon
state courts. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 187 (1953); Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342
U.S. 55, 64 (1951).
The issue of "unnecessary delay" in Futch had been formerly raised in
Commonwealth v. Koch, 446 Pa. 469, 288 A.2d 791 (1972). There the court found that
the defendant was "repeatedly and carefully warned of his constitutional rights and
properly treated by the police." Id. at 474, 285 A.2d at 793. There was no evidence in
Koch of delay for the purpose of inducing a confession. Id. at 474, 288 A.2d at 793-94.
The court went on to state that "[tihe presence of 'unnecessary delay' in securing a
preliminary arraignment is a factor to be considered in assessing the voluntariness of
a confession." Id. at 474-75, 288 A.2d at 794 (citations omitted). For a discussion of
the McNabb-Mallory rule, Futch, and Koch, see generally Pennsylvania Supreme
Court Review: Developments in Pennsylvania Criminal Procedure, 47 TEMP. L. Q. 38,
49-55 (1973).
After Futch, a decided split among the justices evolved in similar prearraign-
ment cases. In all the following cases the justices were divided 4-3 over the issue of
exclusion of statements due to prearraignment delay. Commonwealth v. Lasch, 464
Pa. 259, 346 A.2d 547 (1975); Commonwealth v. Abu-Ibn Hanifah Bey, 462 Pa. 533, 341
A.2d 902 (1975); Commonwealth v. Cullison, 461 Pa. 301, 336 A.2d 296 (1975);
Commonwealth v. Barilak, 460 Pa. 449, 333 A.2d 859 (1975); Commonwealth v.
Johnson, 459 Pa. 171, 327 A.2d 618 (1974); Commonwealth v. Wilson, 458 Pa. 285, 327
A.2d 621 (1974); Commonwealth v. Sanders, 458 Pa. 281, 327 A.2d 43 (1974);
Commonwealth v. Cherry, 457 Pa. 201, 321 A.2d 611 (1974); Commonwealth v. Dixon,
454 Pa. 444, 311 A.2d 613 (1973); Commonwealth v. Dutton, 453 Pa. 542, 307 A.2d 238
(1973).
Commonwealth v. Tingle, 451 Pa. 241, 301 A.2d 701 (1973), aptly illustrates
the grounds for this split in the court. In that case, Justice Eagen, in a concurring
opinion in which Justices Jones and Pomeroy joined, viewed rule 118 (current version
at PA. R. CRIM. P. 130) as "a mere procedural device, lacking in constitutional
dimension." Id. at 249, 301 A.2d at 705. The majority, however, relying on Futch and
4
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further in Commonwealth v. Williams,16 which formulated a three-part test
to determine whether there has been an "unnecessary delay"'17 prohibited by
the rules of criminal procedure. This test requires that the following
questions be answered: 1) Was the delay unnecessary? 2) Was any
prejudicial evidence obtained during the delay? 3) Was any such prejudicial
evidence reasonably related to the delay?' 8 At least one subsequent case has
stated that "the only delay which can be tolerated is that necessary for
administrative processing,"'19 which was described in Williams as "finger-
printing, photographing, and the like."
'20
rules 118 and 119 (current versions at PA. R. CRIM. P. 130, 140),had found that the
unnecessary delay in Tingle required exclusion of prejudicial statements made during
such detention. 451 Pa. at 247, 301 A.2d at 704. These sentiments were transformed
into a debate concerning the retroactive application of the Futch rule. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Dutton, 453 Pa. 542, 307 A.2d 238 (1973). This debate over the
retroactivity of Futch was the basis for most of the splits in the aforementioned cases.
The McNabb-Mallory and Futch rules have both a procedural and an
evidentiary dimension, since violation of the procedural rule results in the exclusion of
certain evidence. See Hogan & Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale
and Rescue, 47 GEo. L.J. 1, 2 (1958).
Curiously enough the court in Futch recognized the McNabb-Mallory rule
despite the fact that Congress had modified it by legislation in 1968. See § 3501(c) of
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c) (1976),
which provides that a confession is not admissible solely because of delay if the trial
judge finds the confession was voluntary, if the weight to be given to the confession is
left to the jury, and if the confession was made within six hours of arrest or detention,
provided such delay was not a result of transportation problems. Id. The delay
between arrest and arraignment is only one factor to be considered in determining
voluntariness. Id. § 3501(b). For judicial interpretations of this statute, see United
States v. Davis, 459 F.2d 167, 170 (6th Cir. 1972) (court noted that Congress modified
the Mallory rule by statute); United States v. Davis, 456 F.2d 1192, 1195 (10th Cir.
1972) (factors in McNabb and Mallory are among those to be used in determining
voluntariness); United States v. Hathorn, 451 F.2d 1337, 1341 (5th Cir. 1971) (any
delay beyond six hours is merely another factor in determining voluntariness and not
conclusive); United States v. Halbert, 436 F.2d 1226, 1232-37 (9th Cir. 1970) (interprets
§ 3501(c) to make voluntary admissions within six hours of arrest clearly admissible
and those made beyond six hours admissible if voluntary). But see United States v.
Mendoza, 473 F.2d 697, 702 (5th Cir. 1973) (a violation of unnecessary delay provision
of rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure renders evidence inadmissible).
This legislation is generally believed to be constitutional. See Note, Title II of the
Omnibus Crime Control Act: A Study in Constitutional Conflict, 57 GEO. L.J. 438,
449-54 (1968); Comment, Title II of the Omnibus Crime Bill: A Study of the
Interaction of Law and Politics, 48 NEB. L. REV. 193, 207-08 (1968). For a discussion
of congressional power to formulate a test of admissibility different from the Supreme
Court's, see generally S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 53-63, reprinted in [1968]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2112, 2139-50.
16. 455 Pa. 569, 319 A.2d 419 (1974). The Williams court found that defendant's
statement taken during a 27 hour delay was prejudicial since it "constituted the most
telling element of the Commonwealth's case against Williams." Id. at 572-73, 319
A.2d at 420. The delay was found unnecessary since it was not justified by
administrative processing but was utilized for corroborating defendant's statement.
Id. at 573, 319 A.2d at 421. The court also found the statement elicited after seven
hours reasonably related to the total delay. Id.
17. Id. at 573-74, 319 A.2d at 421.
18. Id. at 572, 319 A.2d at 420.
19. Commonwealth v. Odom, 467 Pa. 395, 399, 357 A.2d 150, 152 (1976), citing
Commonwealth v. Tingle, 451 Pa. 241, 245, 301 A.2d 701, 703 (1973).
20. 455 Pa. at 573, 319 A.2d at 421.
[VOL. 23
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Before setting forth a new six-hour rule, the Davenport court
addressed the issue of whether Davenport's statements given during
prearraignment detention should have been admitted into evidence at his
trial.21 The court explored the procedural22 and judicial2 3 policies behind the
requirement of "preliminary arraignment without unnecessary delay" 24 and
determined that it serves two important functions. Prompt arraignment both
ensures that the accused is informed of his constitutional rights25 by a
"neutral judicial officer" 26 and "minimizes the possibility of unnecessary
abridgement of a citizen's liberty ' 27 by checking against abuse by the
arresting authority. 28 The court explained that if the accused was not
afforded arraignment promptly, Futch rendered evidence obtained during
the period of unnecessary delay inadmissible at trial. 29 Applying the three-
part Williams test 3° to the facts sub judice, the court determined that the
delay was unnecessary 31 and that the evidence obtained during the delay
was both prejudicial 32 and reasonably related to the delay.33 The Davenport
21. 471 Pa. at 282-86, 370 A.2d at 304-06.
22. The Davenport court noted that rules 122 and 130 of the Pennsylvania Rules
of Criminal Procedure mandate that an accused be brought before a judicial officer for
preliminary arraignment without unnecessary delay. 471 Pa. at 282, 370 A.2d at 304,
citing PA. R. CRIM. P. 122, 130. See note 3 supra. The court acknowledged that these
rules served the purpose of promptly providing the protections enumerated in rule 140
of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure. 471 Pa. at 282-83, 370 A.2d at 304
(citation omitted). Rule 140 provides that the court shall inform the accused of the
charges against him, his right to counsel, his right to a preliminary hearing, and his
right to bail. PA. R. CRIM. P. 140.
23. 471 Pa. at 283, 370 A.2d at 304, citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975)
(an accused has the right to be free from unreasonable seizure of his person); Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (defendant's right to counsel); Commonwealth v.
Dixon, 454 Pa. 444, 311 A.2d 613 (1973) (prompt arraignment requirement ensures
accused is promptly afforded rights embodied in rule 140 and checks against abuse by
arresting officer); Commonwealth v. Tingle, 451 Pa. 241, 301 A.2d 701 (1973) (prompt
arraignment requirement ensures accused is promptly afforded rights embodied in
rule 140 and checks against abuse by arresting officer). For a discussion of rule 140,
see note 22 supra.
24. 471 Pa. at 282, 370 A.2d at 304.
25. Id. at 283, 370 A.2d at 304.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 284, 370 A.2d at 304 quoting Commonwealth v. Dixon, 454 Pa. 444, 446,
311 A.2d 613, 614 (1973).
28. 471 Pa. at 283, 370 A.2d at 304.
29. 471 Pa. at 284, 370 A.2d at 305. For a discussion of the Futch case, see notes
13-15 and accompanying text supra. The court further stated that this rule had been
adopted not simply to guard against coercion, but to ensure that the defendant's
rights are afforded without unnecessary delay. Id. For a discussion of the utility of the
exclusionary rule, see note 55 infra.
30. For a discussion of the Williams test, see notes 16-18 and accompanying text
supra.
31. 471 Pa. at 284-85, 370 A.2d at 305. The delay was found unnecessary, since it
was "attributed to investigation and interrogation." Id. at 285, 370 A.2d at 305.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 285-86, 370 A.2d at 305-06. The court found that the evidence and the
delay were reasonable related, since defendant did not confess until after eight hours
of detention. Id. at 286, 370 A.2d at 306. It is interesting to note that despite the
discussion of the McNabb-Mallory rule in Futch, the Davenport court made no
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court thus concluded that the defendant's "statement should have been
suppressed as a product of unnecessary prearraignment delay.
' '34
In addition to ruling on Davenport's detention, the court, pursuant to its
supervisory powers,35 announced a six-hour limitation between arrest and
arraignment.36 In introducing the new rule, the court noted that its
experience since Futch37 led to the conclusion that it "should adopt a rule
under which the admissibility of any statement taken while the accused is in
custody before preliminary arraignment is based on the length of delay
between arrest and arraignment." 38 The new rule requires that
[i]f the accused is not arraigned within six hours of arrest, any
statement obtained after arrest but before arraignment shall not be
admissible at trial. If the accused is arraigned within six hours of arrest,
pre-arraignment delay shall not be grounds for suppression of such
34. 471 Pa. at 286, 370 A.2d at 306. Since the admission of this statement had
been objected to at trial, the court ruled that the defendant was entitled to a new trial.
Id.
35. Id. With respect to the supervisory powers of the Pennsylvania state courts
over the administration of justice, article V, § 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution
provides in part:
(a) The Supreme Court shall exercise general supervisory and administrative
authority over all the courts and justices of the peace.
(c) The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules
governing practice, procedure and the conduct of all courts, justices of the
peace and all officers serving process or enforcing orders, judgments or
decrees of any court or justice of the peace ... and the administration of all
courts and supervision of all officers of the judicial branch, if such rules are
consistent with this Constitution and neither abridge, enlarge nor modify
the substantive rights of any litigant, nor affect the right of the General
Assembly to determine the jurisdiction of any court or justice of the peace,
nor suspend nor alter any statute of limitation or repose. All laws shall be
suspended to the extent that they are inconsistent with rules prescribed
under these provisions.
PA. CONST. art. V, § 10.
36. 471 Pa. at 286, 370 A.2d at 306.
37. Id. The court might have been suggesting that case law prior to Davenport
was consistent with and required the promulgation of a six-hour rule. The court also
might have been alluding to the heavy case load of prearraignment delay cases.
The six-hour rule, however, does differ to some extent from the Futch rule (see
text accompanying notes 13-15 supra) in requiring that the delay be measured
between arrest and arraignment. Id. at -, 370 A.2d at 306. Some prior cases
measured the delay between arrest and the eliciting of a statement. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Palmer, 463 Pa. 26, 31, 342 A.2d 387, 390 (1975); Commonwealth v.
Lasch, 464 Pa. 259, 262, 346 A.2d 547, 548-49 (1975); Commonwealth v. Cullison, 461
Pa, 301, 303, 336 A.2d 296, 297 (1975); Commonwealth v. Barilak, 460 Pa. 449, 452, 333
A.2d 859, 861 (1975); Commonwealth v. Parker, 458 Pa. 381, 389, 327 A.2d 128, 132
(1974); Commonwealth v. Dixon, 454 Pa. 444, 446, 311 A.2d 613, 615 (1973).
Furthermore, the Davenport rule requires the suppression of all statements if the six
hours is exceeded. 471 Pa. at 286, 370 A.2d at 306, whereas the Futch rule required
suppression of all prejudicial evidence reasonably related to an unnecessary delay.
447 Pa. at 394, 290 A.2d at 419. See note 49 and accompanying text infra.
38. 471 Pa. at 286, 370 A.2d at 306.
[VOL. 23
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statements except as the delay may be relevant to constitutional
standards of admissibility.
39
The court's stated purpose in promulgating the six-hour limitation was
to clarify the admissibility standards for statements taken during unneces-
sary delays.40 The court specifically mentioned the benefits of certainty,
"even-handed application," judicial economy, and reduction of pretrial
delay.4 The inflexible six-hour standard 2 would, according to the court, also
serve to discourage violation of the prompt arraignment requirement and
thereby ensure speedy implementation of the protections provided by
preliminary arraignment.4 3 In a footnote the court recognized that "it is
difficult to fix any particular time limit. Nevertheless, we conclude that six
hours provides a workable rule which can readily be complied with in the
absence of exigent circumstances." 44 The court further stated that any
statements taken within the six-hour time period would still be subject to
39. Id. at 286-87, 370 A.2d at 306 (citations omitted) (footnote omitted). It is
submitted that the court was attempting to promulgate a per se rule with respect to
prearraignment detention. Black's Law Dictionary defines per se as "[b]y himself or
itself; taken alone; inherently; in isolation; unconnected with other matters." BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY 1294 (4th ed. rev. 1968) (citations omitted).
The court also stated that the six-hour standard was consistent with the
court's prior determination of what constituted "unnecessary delay." 471 Pa. at 286
n.7, 370 A.2d at 306 n.7. Although six hours or more may usually have been
recognized as constituting "unnecessary delay," in some pre-Davenport cases
statements were held admissible because such evidence was not reasonably related to
the delay or because the delay was found to be necessary. See Commonwealth v.
Coley, 466 Pa. 53, 61-62, 64-65, 351 A.2d 617, 621, 623 (1976); Commonwealth v.
Boone, 467 Pa. 168, 176-77, 354 A.2d 898, 902 (1975); Commonwealth v. Tervalon, 463
Pa. 581, 591 n.7, 345 A.2d 671, 676 n.7 (1975); Commonwealth v. Rogers, 463 Pa. 393,
397, 344 A.2d 889, 891 (1975); Commonwealth v. Palmer, 463 Pa. 26, 30-31, 342 A.2d
387, 389-90 (1975); Commonwealth v. Milton, 461 Pa. 535, 541, 337 A.2d 282, 285
(1975); Commonwealth v. Bryant, 461 Pa. 3, 12-13, 334 A.2d 603, 608 (1975);
Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 460 Pa. 686, 693-94, 334 A.2d 588, 591 (1975). A
detention exceeding six hours has also been found necessary to permit "initial police
questioning and administrative processing due to the unusual circumstances and the
number of people involved." Commonwealth v. Simmons, 239 Pa. Super. Ct. 220, 224,
362 A.2d 402, 404 (1976).
40. 471 Pa. at 287, 370 A.2d at 306.
41. Id. The court asserted that judicial economy should result, since the task of
determining admissibility of statements will be simplified. Id. This simplification,
according to the court, "should also lessen the burden on prosecution and defense
resources." Id. The court also reasoned that pretrial delay would be reduced since
there would be little need for pretrial litigation on admissibility of statements. Id.
42. See note 39 supra.
43. 471 Pa. at 287-88, 370 A.2d at 306. See notes 22-28 and accompanying text
supra. For a discussion of the efficacy of the exclusionary rule in carrying out these
purposes, see note 55 and accompanying text infra.
44. 471 Pa. at 286 n.7, 370 A.2d at 306 n.7. The recognition by the court of the
possibility of exigent circumstances hindering compliance may, it is submitted,
provide a practical exception to the apparently rigid new rule. The intended meaning
of this somewhat cryptic footnote should become clearer when the supreme court has
the opportunity to confront "exigent circumstances" assertions in subsequent cases.
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"constitutional standards of admissibility."45 Finally the court declared that
the six-hour limitation would be applicable only prospectively.
46
Although the Davenport court promulgated the rule after careful
delineation of the policies behind prompt arraignment as reflected in
applicable Pennsylvania case law and procedural rules, 47 several unans-
wered questions and practical problems arise with respect to the six-hour
standard. 48 The fact that the court did not define such terms as "statement"
and "arrest" which are used within the rule may well produce inconsistency
in interpretation and application. The term "any statement" used in the
rule49 could be interpreted to include either oral or written statements, or
45. 471 Pa. at 287, 370 A.2d at 306, citing Commonwealth v. Eiland, 450 Pa. 566,
301 A.2d 651 (1973) and Commonwealth ex rel. Butler v. Rundle, 429 Pa. 141, 239 A.2d
426 (1968). In the latter two cases confessions were considered involuntary and
therefore inadmissible. 450 Pa. at 574, 301 A.2d at 654-55; 429 Pa. at 156, 239 A.2d at
431. Both cases also considered a lengthy detention between arrest and arraignment
to be one factor used in assessing involuntariness. 450 Pa. at 572-74, 301 A.2d at
653-54; 429 Pa. at 154-56, 239 A.2d at 432-33. Involuntariness is not actually an
exception to the per se six-hour rule, since any rule promulgated by the court would be
subject to constitutional standards. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,
172-80 (1803). Furthermore, it would seem that the fifth and fourteenth amendments
would require the exclusion of any coerced statements, whether or not a delay was
part of the coercion. See generally Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (compulsory
self-incrimination, as protected by the fifth amendment, is also protected against state
infringement by the fourteenth amendment); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286
(1936) (confessions obtained by torture are inconsistent with the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment); Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897) (fifth
amendment controls issue of whether a confession is incompetent because involun-
tary).
46. 471 Pa. at 288, 370 A.2d at 307. The court attached an order to the opinion
which postponed the effective date of the rule until May 16, 1977. Id.
47. Id. Pa. at 282-88, 370 A.2d at 304-07. See notes 22-33 and accompanying
text supra.
48. See note 63 and accompanying text infra.
49. 471 Pa. at 286, 370 A.2d at 306. The Davenport rule differs from the Futch
rule in requiring that "any statement" be excluded rather than "all evidence." Id. See
Commonwealth v. Futch, 447 Pa. 389, 394, 290 A.2d 417, 419 (1972) (lineup
identification of an accused who lacked counsel suppressed). The Federal Rules of
Evidence define a statement as: "(1) [Aln oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal
conduct of a person, if it is intended by him as an assertion." FED. R. EVID. 801(a). It
is questionable whether the court's emphasis in Davenport on excluding statements is
justified, since studies show that interrogation is necessary in only a small percentage
of arrests. See Witt, Non-Coercive Interrogation and the Administration of Criminal
Justice: The Impact of Miranda on Police Effectuality, 64 J. CRIM. L.C.&P.S. 320,
324-25 (1973); Comment, Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 6
YALE L.J. 1519, 1640-41 (1967).
Since the six-hour rule supersedes the Williams test, a strict application of the
six-hour rule would presumably require exclusion of statements not prejudicial to an
accused. See Commonwealth v. Simmons, 239 Pa. Super. Ct. 220, 362 A.2d 402 (1976)
(statement taken during six-hour delay between arrest and arraignment admissible
since statement was not connected to the delay, was not a confession but exculpatory
and, therefore, not prejudicial). This would imply that words not constituting
admissions, declarations or confessions would be subject to exclusion if the six-hour
limit were exceeded. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jones, 97 Pa. Super. Ct. 417, 421
(1929) (statements revealing defendant's act, conduct, and declarations before the
crime were admissible to show motive and intent); Commonwealth v. Lewis, 190 Pa.
Super. Ct. 591, 596, 155 A.2d 410, 413 (1959) (statements amounting to attempts at
concealment or diverting suspicion were admissible since they were not considered
confessions). The difference between an admission and a confession has been
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both,5° as well as gestures or other nonverbal communications. 5' The rule
could thus also be read to require the exclusion of exculpatory statements
made by the accused during prearraignment, unless courts determine that
the rule is inapplicable with respect to exculpatory statements.
5 2
It is suggested that, although the rule's six-hour period begins with the
arrest, because "arrest" is not defined, it may be difficult to discern in a
particular case when arrest occurs and the counting of the six-hour period is
triggered.53 The brevity of the period of time covered by the rule makes it
imperative, it is submitted, that a clear definition of arrest be provided to
those whose responsibility it is to ensure compliance. At a minimum it
should be specified whether the six hours begins with the interference with a
citizen's liberty or with the formal booking.
54
described as follows: "An admission is a statement pertinent to the issues and
tending, in connection with other proof, to establish guilt; it is distinguishable from a
confession in that a confession ... is an acknowledgment of guilt in express terms,
and a statement may be admissible as an admission even though not admissible as a
confession." 10A P.L.E. Criminal Law §291 (1970) (footnotes omitted). For cases
making a similar distinction, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Oreszak, 328 Pa. 65, 69-70,
195 A. 45, 48 (1937); Commonwealth v. Elliott, 292 Pa. 16, 20, 140 A. 537, 538-39
(1928); Commonwealth v. Tenbroeck, 265 Pa. 251, 254, 108 A. 635, 636 (1919);
Commonwealth v. Meehan, 198 Pa. Super. Ct. 558, 565, 182 A.2d 212, 216 (1962), rev'd
on other grounds, 409 Pa. 616, 187 A.2d 579 (1963).
50. For examples of oral statements made in various contexts and held
admissible, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lopinson, 427 Pa. 284, 299, 234 A.2d 552, 561
(1967), vacated on other grounds, 392 U.S. 647 (1968) (statements made at scene of
shooting held admissible); Commonwealth v. Elliott, 292 Pa. 16, 20-21, 140 A. 537,
538-39 (1928) (testimony about conversation between detective and accused held
admissible).
51. See Commonwealth v. Moon, 389 Pa. 304, 309-10, 32 A.2d 224, 227, petition for
cert. dismissed, 355 U.S. 908 (1957) (memorandum of gestures of defendant unable to
speak due to self-inflicted wounds found admissible).
52. Under the Futch rule, exculpatory statements were excluded because they
are not prejudicial. Commonwealth v. Simmons, 239 Pa. Super Ct. 220, 225, 362 A.2d
402, 404-05 (1976). The Davenport rule, strictly applied, would enable the prosecution,
theoretically at least, to seek suppression of exculpatory statements made during
excessive prearraignment periods. This result is so obviously inconsistent with the
purposes of the rule in allowing the prosecution to benefit by excessive detentions,
that courts should have no difficulty, it is submitted, in granting defendants' motions
not to apply the six-hour rule to exculpatory statements.
53. The cases from Futch to Davenport do not define when arrest begins. For
several definitions of an arrest, see Commonwealth v. Richards, 458 Pa. 455, 459, 327
A.2d 63, 65 (1974) ("arrest" is "any act that indicates an intention to take an
individual into custody and that subjects him to the actual control and will of the
person making the arrest"); Commonwealth v. Dorsey, 212 Pa. Super. Ct. 339, 343, 243
A.2d 176, 177 (1968) ("arrest" constitutes "apprehension or detention of the person of
another in order that he may be forthcoming to answer for an alleged crime").
Professor Wayne LaFave defined arrest as a "distinct operational step in the criminal
justice process, involving all police decisions to interfere with the freedom of a person
who is suspected of criminal conduct to the extent of taking him to the police station
for some purpose." LAFAvE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO
CUSTODY 5 (1965). See also Note, Philadelphia Police Practice and the Law of Arrest,
100 U. Pa. L. REV. 1182, 1185-88 (1952).
54. Failure to define an arrest may present police officers with insolvable
problems. See note 53 supra. Is an arrest the interference with a citizen's liberty, such
as detaining a material witness or is it simply the formal booking? If arrest is the
former, then what if the material witness ultimately becomes the accused so that the
total detention exceeds the six hours? If, on the other hand, arrest is the formal
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There is a legitimate concern that the Davenport court's choice of a
single enforcement mechanism 55 - inadmissibility of statements - may
booking or the point at which a citizen is identified as an accused, then presuming
adherence to constitutional standards, statements made prior to booking would be
outside the scope of the rule. For a discussion of several definitions of arrest, see note
53 supra.
55. In those states which do provide for prompt arraignment or arraignment
within a set time period, the exclusion of evidence obtained is not the only
enforcement mechanism utilized. For examples of judicially or legislatively imposed
enforcement mechanisms to protect against prearraignment delay in other states, see
Gerlack v. Ferrari, 184 Cal. App. 2d 702, 7 Cal. Rptr. 699 (1960) (where the arrest is
lawful, violation of provision against unnecessary delay subjects the offending person,
to liability for false imprisonment); Zdiarstek v. State, 53 Wis. 2d 420,192 N.W.2d 833
(1972) (due process requires exclusion of statements made during unreasonably long
detention); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-17 (Supp. 1977) (officer violating unnecessary
delay standard shall be guilty of a misdemeanor). Statutes with fixed time periods
that contain enforcement mechanisms include: ALAsKA STAT. § 12.25.150(c) (1972)
(violation of 24 hour rule punishable as misdemeanor by fine of no more than $100
and/or 30 days); ARiz. R. CRIM. P. 4.1(a) (if not brought before a magistrate within 24
hours, accused shall immediately be released); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-212 (1972) any
person not arraigned within 48 hours shall be released); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 544.170
(Vernon 1953) (unless charged "by the oath of some credible person within 20 hours,"
suspect shall be discharged).
The exclusionary rule, established in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398
(1914) and extended to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656-57 (1961),
requires that illegally obtained evidence not be admitted in court. In Pennsylvania the
exclusionary rule has been codified in the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure.
PA. R. CRIM. P. 323. The purposes behind the rule are to preserve the "clean hands" of
the court and to prevent police use of illegal tactics for obtaining evidence. 367 U.S. at
657, 659. See generally Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a
Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1559-63 (1972); Kaplan, The Limits of the
Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027 (1974); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary
Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHi. L. REv. 665 (1970).
The exclusionary dimension of the six-hour rule has apparently been effective
in at least one urban Pennsylvania setting. Interview with Gilbert Branche, Field
Support Units, Staff Services Bureau Inspector. Philadelphia Police Department
(Sept. 26, 1977). Since the violating policeman is not directly punished and because a
convicted criminal might be released due to insufficient evidence for a new trial, the
exclusionary rule is not without its critics, one of the strongest being Chief Justice
Burger. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 412-24 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Recently, in Brewer v.
Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), Chief Justice Burger filed a strong dissent stating that
the court had improperly failed to weigh the social costs of setting a convicted
criminal free against the benefits of applying the exclusionary rule. Id. at 420-29
(Burger, C.J., dissenting). The rule before Brewer had undergone significant
deterioration in its application. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 489-95 (1976)
(collateral relief by way of federal habeas corpus not available for claimed violation of
exclusionary rule where claim already fully and fairly litigated in the state courts);
United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 443-60 (1976) (Mapp rule held not to extend to
federal civil proceedings to exclude evidence seized by a state criminal enforcement
officer); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 606, 608-09 (1975) (giving of Miranda
warnings served to break causal connection between illegal arrest and giving of a
statement) (Powell, J., concurring). For criticisms of the exclusionary rule and
possible alternatives, see generally Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman?, 14 AM.
U.L. REV. 1, 10-23 (1964); Kaplan, supra at 1029-55; Oaks, supra at 672-757; Spiotta,
Search and Seizure: An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule and Its
Alternatives, 2 J. LEGAL STUDIES 243, 268-78 (1973). Despite the criticism of the
exclusionary rule, it is perhaps better than no restraint at all on the police. See Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636 (1965); Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 652, 656 (1961). See also Paulsen, Safeguards in the Law of Search
and Seizure, 52 Nw. U.L. REV. 1, 12 (1964); Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and
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not, as the Davenport court expects, be wholly effective in achieving the goal
of prompt arraignment.56 Consider, for example, the many situations in
which statements are superfluous to the prosecution. Nevertheless, it would
seem indisputable that the rule, by specifically limiting interrogation, will
result in fewer prearraignment delays.
57
Since the rule applies only to the exclusion of statements elicited during
interrogation if the suspect is not arraigned within the six-hour period, 58 if a
defendant elects to remain silent, the rule does not require that he be
arraigned within six hours. In these situations, however, the "unnecessary
delay" prohibition already incorporated into the Pennsylvania Rules of
Criminal Procedure59 would still seem applicable. Perhaps the greatest
weakness of the Davenport rule may be exposed by a case in which strong,
incriminating evidence from sources other than the accused has been
uncovered prior to or soon after arrest,60 so that the incentive to comply with
the rule in order to preserve inculpatory statements may be totally lacking.
61
Since the rule is only applicable to arrests occurring on and after May
16, 1977,62 no cases have yet been found which applied the Davenport rule.
Interviews with a judge, prosecutors and a police inspector, revealed several
practical problems with respect to the rule. These difficulties accentuate the
Misconduct by the Police, 52 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 255, 257 (1961). It is nevertheless
questionable whether the exclusionary remedy is adequate or necessary with respect
to statements elicited during an unnecessay delay since other states with rules similar
to rules 122 and 130 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure (see note 3
supra) either provide different enforcement mechanisms or none at all.
A corollary to the exclusionary rule is the "derivative doctrine," which
requires that evidence derived from other illegally obtained evidence must be
excluded. See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920). For a
discussion of this doctrine and its relationship to McNabb-Mallory, see generally
Broeder, Wong Sun v. U.S., A Study in Faith and Hope, 42 NEB. L. REv. 483, 564-94
(1963); Comment, Fruit of the Poisonous Tree - A Plea for Relevant Criteria, 115 U.
PA. L. REV. 1136 (1967). The court in Davenport did not address the effects of the
derivative doctrine upon the six-hour per se rule, though, pursuant to the policy
considerations behind the rule, the doctrine logically should be applicable here and
the fruits of any statement elicited in violation of the rule should be inadmissible. For
a discussion of the purposes behind speedy arraignment and the purposes of the six-
hour rule, see notes 22-28 & 41-43 and accompanying text supra.
56. See 471 Pa. at 287, 370 A.2d at 306.
57. The Davenport rule does not, however, of its own force prevent all
prearraignment delay. For instance, the rule would not per se require the exclusion of
identifications made at a lineup held during an extensive delay, although the Futch
rule would seem to apply. See notes 13-15 and accompanying text supra. For cases
dealing with the exclusion of an identification at a lineup conducted during
prearraignment detention, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Futch, 447 Pa. 389, 290 A.2d
417 (1972); Commonwealth v. Weaver, 231 Pa. Super. Ct. 220, 331 A.2d 852 (1974);
Commonwealth v. Corbett, 228 Pa. Super. Ct. 292, 323 A.2d 836 (1974).
58. 471 Pa. at 286, 370 A.2d at 306.
59. See PA. R. CRIM. P. 122, 130; note 3 supra.
60. Collecting such evidence from other sources cannot justify unnecessary delay.
Commonwealth v. Williams, 255 Pa. 569, 573, 319 A.2d 419, 421 (1974).
61. Nevertheless, even when Davenport is not applicable, an "unnecessary delay"
would presumably be violative of rules 122 and 130 of the Pennsylvania Rules of
Criminal Procedure. See note 3 supra.
62. 471 Pa. at 288, 370 A.2d at 307.
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tension between ensuring a defendant's constitutional rights and pursuing
thorough police investigation of crime.
63
According to the rule, if a suspect is not arraigned within six hours, any
statements elicited during prearraignment interrogation will be excluded,
even if the delay is not due to police action. Prearraignment delay caused by
the defendant could redound to his benefit.64 For instance, if an accused lied
about his name or age, the resulting delay in arraignment would make any
statements given during prearraignment inadmissible if the six hours were
exceeded.
65
Excessive delay may also be due to the unavailability of a judicial
official. One Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas judge told of a call he had
received from the police requesting a judge within seven minutes, which was
not enough time to reach the police station.66 The suspect was not arraigned
until five minutes after the six-hour period.67 The problem arose because the
police had waited until the last minute to arraign and because another judge
had left early.6 8 The unavailability of a judicial officer for arraignment
within six hours could be a common problem in rural areas even when police
attempt to arraign promptly.
69
63. It is submitted that many of these problems are due to a lack of
communication between the courts and the police. See generally LaFave &
Remington, Controlling the Police: The Judge's Role in Making and Reviewing Law
Enforcement Decisions, 63 MICH. L. REV. 987, 1003-08 (1965); Wasby, The
Communication of the Supreme Courts Criminal Procedure Decisions: A Preliminary
Mapping, 18 VILL. L. REV. 1086 (1973). As one author has stated: "The making of
rules externally for police conduct suffers from two principal limitations. One is the
absence of direct police involvement in the process." McGowan, Rule-Making and the
Police, 70 MICH. L. REV. 659, 672 (1972). One commentator views the difficulties with
controlling police behavior through court rulemaking to be inherent in the imposition
of legislative functions on the judiciary. Speaking with respect to Supreme Court
rulemaking, Professor Packer stated:
Nobody else is exerting control over the law enforcement process, so the justices
think that they must. But they can do so, in state cases at any rate, only in the
discharge of their duty to construe the Constitution in cases that come before
them. And so, the rules of the criminal process, which ought to be the subject of
flexible inquiry and adjustment by law-making bodies having the institutional
capacity to deal with them, are evolved through a process that its warmest
defenders recognize as to some extent awkward and inept: the rules become
"constitutionalized."
Packer, The Courts, the Police, and the Rest of Us, 57 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 238, 240
(1966). For a discussion of this tension between a defendant's rights and effective law
enforcement, see generally Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L.
REV. 1 (1964).
64. Interview with Anita Cohen, Assistant District Attorney, Philadelphia (Sept.
24, 1977); Branche interview, supra note 55.
65. Cohen interview, supra note 64; Branche interview, supra note 55.




69. ALI has taken rural areas into account and provides an exception to the five
hour total maximum of the prearraignment period. Section 130.5 of the ALI's' MODEL
CODE, supra note 12, reads as follows:
The regulations issued pursuant to Subsection 10.3(1) shall include provisions
applicable to law enforcement agencies in counties [of a population yet to be
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Furthermore, if a suspect is arrested in another state, extradited to
Pennsylvania and arraigned after the six-hour limit, any statements made
before arraignment would presumably have to be suppressed under a strict
application of the rule.70 Another problem could arise if a defendant
committed a crime in Pennsylvania and was arrested and interrogated in
another state. If he confessed during a detention exceeding six hours in a
foreign state and was subsequently extradited to Pennsylvania, a narrow
interpretation of the rule would presumably require that the defendant's
confession be suppressed.
71
Another practical problem arises for the police as a result of the on-the-
scene calculations which a policeman must now make as to when he can
properly interrogate an arrested suspect. For instance, if a suspect arrested
at 10 a.m. suffers a heart attack at 3 p.m. and is therefore not arraigned
until several days later, should any statement taken during prearraignment
be admissible at the suspect's trial?72 If so, should a statement taken
between 10 a.m. and 3 p.m. be admissible and a statement given after 3 p.m.
be excluded? 73 Such questions, it is suggested, highlight the need in
emergency situations for an exception to the six-hour rule.
7 4
Despite these potential problems with the rule, since the court in a
subsequent order refers to the Davenport rule as a "new Rule of Criminal
determined] setting forth different procedures or time periods for taking action
from those specified in the preceding sections of Article 130, provided that such
procedures shall meet applicable constitutional requirements, insure that an
arrested person is brought before a judicial officer without unnecessary delay,
and make provision for an adequate record for determination of compliance with
the provisions of the Code. For purposes of determining whether statements are
excludable pursuant to Subsections 150.2(3), (4) and (5), compliance with such
regulations shall be deemed to be compliance with the applicable provisions of
this Article 130.
MODEL CODE, supra note 12, at § 130.5.
70. The Davenport rule could conflict with §110 of the Uniform Criminal
Extradiction Act which states in pertinent part:
No person arrested upon [a foreign jurisdiction's warrant] shall be delivered
over to the agent whom the executive authority demanding him shall have
appointed to receive him unless he shall first be taken forthwith before a judge of
a court of record in this State who shall inform him of the demand made for his
surrender and of the crime with which he is charged and that he has the right to
demand and procure legal counsel. ...
UNIFORM CRIMINAL EXTRADICTION ACT § 110.
71. Id.
72. Branche interview, supra note 55.
73. For the basis of this possible exception, see note 44 and accompanying text
supra. This question poses the difficulty of measuring the six hours when an
emergency intervenes. Unless a police officer has the guidance of a strict definition of
"emergency" and can easily pinpoint its beginning and end, it would be hard for him
to determine when interrogation is proper during the delay. An exception to the rule
for emergencies would be easier to apply 1) if the emergency rendered the rule
inapplicable for the duration of the emergency or 2) if only those statements taken
before the occurrence of the emergency were admissible. It is submitted that the first
alternative would be the more reasonable and practical application of the six-hour
rule.
74. See note 44 and the accompanying text supra.
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Procedure," 75 it is respectfully suggested that the Davenport rule be fully
integrated into the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure. 76 Regretta-
bly, if the rule remains in its present form, the lack of standards and
definitions for applying the rule will probably require the court to clarify it
by judicial testing. It is submitted that this time-consuming process will
undermine, at least initially, the goal of judicial economy.7 7 The six-hour
rule is nevertheless a clearer and more workable standard than the Futch
75. 471 Pa. at 288, 370 A.2d at 307. For an explanation of the rulemaking powers
of the court, see note 35 supra. An example of the rulemaking of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court is found in Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 449 Pa. 297, 297 A.2d 127
(1972), in which the Court declared a limit on the period between filing of charges and
trial. Although Hamilton did not set the 180 day standard, the court declared it
"expedient to formulate a rule of criminal procedure fixing a maximum time limit in
which individuals accused of crime shall be brought to trial." Id. at 308-09, 297 A.2d
at 133. The formulation of the rule was eventually incorporated into the Pennsylvania
Rules of Criminal Procedure. See PA. R. CRIM. P. 1100; Marshall & Reiter, A Trial
Court Working with Rule 1100 23 VILL. L. REV. 284 (1978).
76. The following proposed rule of criminal procedure is submitted in the belief
that it preserves the purpose of Davenport and helps to resolve some of the questions
and problems examined in this note:
a) Any person arrested must be arraigned within six (6) hours of arrest.
b) If an arrested person is not arraigned within six hours of arrest, any
statement obtained after arrest but before arraignment shall not be admissible at
trial.
c) If the accused is arraigned within six hours of arrest, prearraignment
delay shall not be grounds for suppression of such statements except as the delay may
be relevant to constitutional standards of admissibility.
d) Any delay in the period between arrest and arraignment that, in the
opinion of the court, is solely attributable to the intentional acts of the arrested person
shall be excluded from the computation of the six-hour period.
e) Any delay in the period between arrest and arraignment that, in the
opinion of the court, is attributable to exigent circumstances shall be excluded from
the computation of the six-hour period.
f) Definitions. For the purposes of this rule, the following definitions shall
apply:
1) Arraignment. Arraignment refers to the preliminary arraignment
procedures defined in rule 140 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure.
2) Arrest. Any police decision which results in the interference with the
liberty of a person suspected of criminal conduct and which interference is for the
purpose of initiating criminal proceedings against that person, shall constitute an
arrest.
3) Exigent Circumstances. Exigent circumstances can be established by
proof that:
(A) a good faith effort to arraign promptly was made, and
(B) the delay was the result of unforseeable circumstances, such as, for
example, illness of the arrested person, preventing arraignment within six hours of
arrest.
4) Statement. A statement is:
(A) an oral or written assertion, or
(B) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by him as an
assertion.
77. See note 41 and accompanying text supra.
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